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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 10-1663
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY JEROME JONES,
Appellant
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00006-001)
District Judge: The Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 22, 2010
BEFORE: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 22, 2010)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Because this opinion is wholly without precedential value we write briefly for the
benefit of the parties, presuming their familiarity with the facts and procedural history of
this case. Jones appeals his sentence. We will affirm.
In a pat-down following a routine traffic stop of an automobile in which Jones was
a passenger, officers discovered that Jones was carrying marijuana and a handgun.
During the pat-down, Jones struggled, attempted to pull away from the officers, and tried
to reach for the gun in his coat. Fortunately, the officers were able to seize control of the
weapon. After his arrest it was confirmed that Jones was a felon with a New York
conviction who was prohibited from possessing firearms. The case was transferred for
federal prosecution and the state charges were dismissed. Jones was charged with
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.
The District Court determined that Jones’ total base offense level was thirty-one
and that he had a criminal history classification of VI. The corresponding Sentencing
Guidelines range was 188 to 235 months and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), there was a
statutory mandatory minimum of 15 years (180 months) to a maximum of life. The
District Court sentenced Jones to 211 months, followed by a 5 year term of supervised
release. Jones’ appeal is premised on his view that a sentence greater than the statutory
minimum is unreasonable. We disagree.
In assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, we review both the procedural and
substantive aspects of the District Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). Jones has not taken issue with the
procedural component of the sentencing and we find no such issues on our own review.
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Jones’ primary argument with respect to substantive unreasonableness is that the
firearm was improperly considered in his sentencing because he did not use the gun and
no one was harmed. However, the District Court noted that the gun in Jones’ possession
was loaded and that he struggled with police during the pat-down, which increased the
threat of harm. The District Court correctly concluded that his possession of the gun in
these circumstances was sufficient to classify him as an armed career criminal.
Next, Jones complains that his armed career criminal classification worked to
unjustly double-count his prior convictions because it was used, first, in the calculation of
his offense level, and second, in his criminal history computation. However, we have
stated previously that double-counting the same conduct is permissible in raising the
offense level, except where it is explicitly prohibited in the Guidelines. United States v.
Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 309 (3d Cir. 2007). No such explicit prohibition exists here.
Jones also asserts that his sentence is unreasonable because New York may
incarcerate him a second time for the same offense, since his conduct was a parole
violation. His argument fails, however, because the instant conviction and a parole
violation are distinct. Moreover, the District Court took this issue into account at
sentencing.
Finally, in general, we find that the District Court properly considered the section
3553(a) factors, noting Jones’ background, the nature of his offense, his significant
criminal history, and the need to provide deterrence and protect society. For all of these
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
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